THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

FRANCE

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A Radio Discussion by

- HENRI BLOCH
- LOUIS GOTTSCHALK
- FRANKLIN SCOTT

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

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NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

FRANCE

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

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*A radio discussion broadcast from the University of Chicago, over stations of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, November 15, 1942, at 1:30 P.M., Central War Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

FRANCE

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On November 7 American troops landed in North Africa. Within three days, French resistance had collapsed. German troops meanwhile had rushed into occupied France to protect the French Mediterranean shore against a possible Allied attack. Within France, Marshal Pétain and Pierre Laval have apparently continued to collaborate with Hitler. But in French North Africa, Admiral Darlan has broken with Vichy and is negotiating with the Allies.

What is the meaning of these events to America? What is the significance of the policy that the Allies adopt in North Africa? What is France? What should be the United States' policy toward France and French North Africa?

To consider these questions and other problems involved in the situation, the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE *presented three experts to discuss the subject of "France."*

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MR. GOTTSCHALK: I think we are agreed that the events of the last week are significant, startling, and welcome. The newspaper editors and radio commentators have said a great many things about them. I feel that it is not necessary for us to repeat all that they have said about the strategic and military importance of the events. Are there not some things we could agree not to include on this ROUND TABLE?

MR. SCOTT: For instance, there is the mere fact that this is the finest thing that has happened in the war so far, and there is also the great post-election boost in American morale that has come about as a result. I think we can take those things for granted, can't we?

MR. BLOCH: I think that that is true. I can also say that everybody who owns a radio set in this country knows by now that we have gained enormous shipping advantages and also that this is the beginning of the long-desired second front.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: A question that it does seem to me we might profitably discuss is what is France. There are a great number of "Frances," and I think that our major discussion ought to lead in that direction.

ANNOUNCER: *In moving into Vichy North Africa, the American Army has taken over more than territory. For example, several* ROUND TABLE *listeners point out that we have taken over the problems of administering Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.* ROUND TABLE *research reveals that these governments have Vichy-inspired laws against trade-unions, laws against Jews, laws against independence movements. How do you think Uncle Sam should deal with these laws and the problems they pose?*

MR. BLOCH: We just heard mentioned Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. There is a difference between those three countries, I might say. Algeria, for instance, has been so far administered as a part of France. It was technically under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior. It had, as long as a Chamber of Deputies existed, representation directly in this Chamber as well as in the Senate. On the other hand, Morocco and Tunisia at least had a nominal sovereignty, under a sultan and the bey, respectively.[1]

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[1] Morocco became a French protectorate in 1912. In accordance with Moslem law and traditions, the sultan remains not only the head and tutor of the whole Sharifian house but the only legislator. His *dahirs*, countersigned by the resident-general (French), are as binding as laws, even on the French residents and colonists in Morocco. His central government is composed of the grand wazir and the wazirs, or ministers, of justice, domains, etc., and the presidents of the High Sharifian Tribunal and of the Tribunal of Appeal of the Chraa (Islamic law).

In Tunisia, "bey" has become the hereditary title of the reigning sovereigns. Tunisia became a protectorate of France in 1881. A resident-general of France, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sits beside the native bey and controls all the public services. The army, education, finance, public works, and agriculture

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The protectorate of France over Morocco was not even recognized by the United States, was it?

MR. BLOCH: This protectorate was established only fairly recently, as you historians would say, anyhow, namely, 1912. Among the Moroccans, America always had high prestige, simply because the United States never recognized this protectorate.

MR. SCOTT: That fact, perhaps, made a little bit of difference when the American Army landed on the shores of Morocco.

MR. BLOCH: The difference which happens to be very important in the case of Tunisia is that there is a very effective and a very important Italian element, namely, about one hundred thousand people, or about as many Italians as Frenchmen who reside in Tunisia.[2]

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The future of these colonies, of course, is bound up with what decision is now made with regard to their temporary government. Undoubtedly the temporary decision now will have an influence upon the future decisions with regard to those governments of the United Nations.

That brings us back to the key question: What would be the expedient thing to do in North Africa?

MR. SCOTT: It seems to me that the most expedient thing to do there is to take advantage of the situation as it exists, and the situation as it exists is that Darlan is there. Darlan has a certain amount of authority—something of the prestige of the Vichy government behind him (if the Vichy government has prestige anywhere, and I presume it does have a little). As a result, the wise policy for the Americans and the British to follow there is what they have actually

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have French directors; the native ministers, under French supervision, are the minister of state and the minister of justice. To meet a desire of the Tunisians for a share in the administration of the protectorate, the Grand Council of Tunisia was formed in 1922. The Council consists of 44 French and 18 nominated native representatives.

[2] See Figure on page 5.

RACIAL GROUPS IN NORTH AFRICA*



* The figures are for 1936 and are taken from *Annuaire statistique de la France, 1938.*

been following, namely, to recognize and use Darlan in so far as he can be used to our own advantage.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The latest news would seem to indicate that the Vichy government has repudiated Darlan. Does that mean that Darlan is no longer in sympathy with Vichy, that he has turned coat and, so to speak, turned his mind as well?

MR. BLOCH: Darlan has followed very strictly the policy of opportunism. He was a collaborationist with Germany when the Germans had the upper hand. He's now collaborating with us because it works out to his personal advantage.

MR. SCOTT: Perhaps we could say that Darlan is now following the policy once enunciated by Paul Reynaud: We would rather collaborate with our friends than with our enemies.[3]

MR. BLOCH: I think that's right, but I would not put Darlan in the same category as Paul Reynaud.

MR. SCOTT: No.

MR. BLOCH: Reynaud has a much different background. Darlan very definitely falls into that general defeatist group which in France has a very long history. They were the people, the rich people of the nobility, who welcomed with joy the Germans in 1815, while the people in the poorer districts of France had the shutters down and were resigned and silent.[4]

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I think that it is true—and I'm glad you bring up this point because a historian would hesitate to do so—that there is a long history of defeatism among the people of France. That certainly is true with regard to the Napoleonic his-

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[3] Paul Reynaud was prime minister of France (March–June, 1940) up to the advent of Pétain. He was an independent conservative and leader of groups who proposed a vigorous foreign policy and adequate military preparations.

[4] This scene was authoritatively described by H. Houssaye, a member of the Académie française.

tory, and it is true of the history of the establishment of the Third Republic.

MR. SCOTT: I would like to point out, though, that there is one difference in the defeatism or adaptation to circumstances in 1940, for, unlike 1815 or 1871, France had an ally still fighting in the field and, perhaps, had something of a moral obligation to try to maintain things.

MR. BLOCH: Let us point out, too, that in 1871 it was the conservative, reactionary government of Thiers which did not allow the workers of Paris to defend the city as they intended to do and tried to do.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: You mention that Darlan was an opportunist. I wonder whether it wouldn't be more correct to say that what he was trying to do was to be on both sides of a rather difficult question at the same time.

MR. BLOCH: To be a mugwump.[5]

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Yes.

MR. SCOTT: He wants to salvage just as much as possible out of the situation, whatever that may be.

It's the duty of any government primarily to preserve itself. Darlan, Pétain, Laval—that whole crowd—I think, were primarily Frenchmen, and they were attempting to do the best thing for France and, let's say, secondarily, each one for himself as well.

MR. BLOCH: I would put up De Gaulle as the ideal French type rather than Darlan, who was an opportunist and a defeatist, and the man who essentially represented an entirely different group—a

[5] A "mugwump" originally was a bolter from the Republican party in the national election of 1884. Prior to this campaign, "mugwump" seems to have been used occasionally as equivalent to "a big man" and usually with a semi-ironical implication. The bolters of the Republican nomination of 1884 were charged with supporting the Democrat, Cleveland, in the interest of civil service reforms. It has come to mean someone who sits on both sides of the fence.



*From Colby and Foster, *Economic Geography* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1940).

group which, I very seriously believe, is a minority among the French people.

MR. SCOTT: Perhaps, but the French people as a whole have followed the Vichy leadership rather than the De Gaulle leadership.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The name "De Gaulle" brings in the question of the Fighting French. Bloch, you know a good deal about these Fighting French. Would you tell us who they are and what their attitudes are?

MR. BLOCH: De Gaulle has said that people say that the Fighting French are clerics; people say they are Jews; people say they are conservative; and people say they are Communists. They are all of these, because they are a bit of everything. They are a cross-section of France in a sense.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Do you think that they really reflect the public opinion of France?

MR. BLOCH: In a certain sense. In the De Gaulle cabinet in London there is today a Radical Socialist,[6] a Protestant Socialist—André Philip[7]—a Catholic priest,[8] and there are a number of people of various shades and opinions. But what is still more important, in my own opinion, is that De Gaulle is definitely not a defeatist.

MR. SCOTT: No, De Gaulle is not a defeatist. De Gaulle represents the hopeful element in the whole French situation as far as we are concerned, and, because he does so, it seems to me we should both support and woo him just as much as possible—perhaps more than we have done in recent months.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: In that connection, of course, it's worth pointing out that we haven't felt it necessary to woo De Gaulle for the simple reason that the poor man is committed. He's so definitely committed to our side that it isn't necessary to consult his feelings at all.[9]

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[6] Refers to Mendès-France. The Radical Socialist party was a moderate republican group opposed to royalism and fascism.

[7] André Philip recently escaped from France, where he was an active leader of the underground movement. He is now a member of the National Committee of the Fighting French and serves as minister of labor and economic reconstruction. Before the war, he was a leader of the Protestant-Socialist movement and was a member of the Chamber of Deputies from Lyon.

[8] Refers to R. P. d'Argenlieu, who is an ordained Catholic priest and also an official of the French navy. He is now a member of the National Committee of the Fighting French.

[9] On July 9, 1942, the United States government named representatives to consult with the Fighting French National Committee in London and sent a memorandum to General de Gaulle that said in part:

"The Government of the United States recognizes the contribution of General de Gaulle and the work of the French National Committee in keeping alive the spirit of French traditions and institutions and believes that the military aims necessary for an effective prosecution of the war and hence the realization of our combined aims are the best advanced by lending all possible military assistance and support to the French National Committee as a symbol of French resistance in general against the Axis powers. . . . .

"The Government of the United States wholeheartedly agrees with the views of the British Government, which is also known to be the view of the French

Mr. Bloch: I'm a poor man, and I'm much more interested in winning the people than in winning persons. I believe that De Gaulle is more interested in winning people than in winning persons, and I believe that De Gaulle actually represents a cleaner tradition among the people than Darlan does. Let me say also that Darlan and Pétain are the much-hated examples of the "general staff" people—the people traditionally opposed to any innovation in tactics, to any innovation in politics. De Gaulle has a long history of being a critic of the general staff.[10]

Mr. Scott: I think that's an important thing for us to keep in mind now as we try to guide our policy, for we find De Gaulle definitely in opposition to this whole old group in France—to the higher military and political officials there.

Mr. Gottschalk: It isn't true, is it, that De Gaulle's tradition in the past has been that of a liberal? One would hardly describe him as a liberal. It so happens that circumstances have put him in opposition to Vichy, which is antiliberal, but does that make him a liberal himself?

Mr. Scott: No, not at all. He was in opposition primarily on the basis of his interpretation of the best interests of France. He thought that France ought to build up a highly mechanized army instead of depending on the Maginot Line, for instance. He's proved himself right in the past, and his policies therefore are worthy of consideration.

National Committee, that the destiny and political organization of France must, in the last analysis, be determined by free expression of the French people under conditions giving them freedom to express their desires unswayed by any form of coercion."

The result of the State Department's measure was to recognize De Gaulle's movement as a military organization but not as a government in exile.

[10] Pétain, as a member of the French High Council of National Defense, opposed the introduction of a mechanized army, which was repeatedly and vigorously demanded by De Gaulle, who accused the general staff of using outmoded methods of warfare. Pétain also opposed the demands for the expansion of the air force which were made by the air minister, Pierre Cot.

MR. BLOCH: I'd like to raise a point. I don't know whether I would like to call De Gaulle a liberal, but I'm quite sure that De Gaulle is not an anti-Semite, which Vichy was and is. I am quite sure that De Gaulle does not want the abolishment of trade-unions, which Vichy actually wants. I also know that De Gaulle sees realities.

Vichy did not understand that the people had developed new movements and new ideas, that those new ideas were strong and had adherents among the people, and that you had to change your mind. De Gaulle could change his mind.

MR. SCOTT: Yes, that's right. In any case, De Gaulle, Darlan, and Giraud are the only ones we really need to consider now, are they not? We have definitely broken with Vichy and the Vichy people and the Vichy policy. Everything that is represented both externally and internally in France, we can now frankly oppose.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: It seems clear that the decision before us is whether we're going to decide to use a person who is either an opportunist or a mugwump—who, in any case, at various times is likely to change his position, who isn't wedded to principle so much as to the circumstances that determine his case—or a man who has all along committed himself to a certain set of principles.

MR. SCOTT: But aren't we going to have a very difficult time if we try to find collaborationists in this world who agree 100 per cent with our point of view?

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I think it is conceivable that De Gaulle is that kind of person. That, at least, is one of the points that we seem to be disagreed on.

MR. BLOCH: You see, and I think you agree with me, at least, that we have to take a stand, because the Vichy government has done certain things in North Africa—things with which Darlan was very clearly identified.

For instance, they have turned the clock back deep into the nineteenth century. They have reintroduced laws against the Jews.



* The figures are for 1936 and are taken from *Annuaire statistique de la France, 1938.*

They have suppressed again, very cruelly even, trade-unions, which were allowed to function under the Popular Front. Do we want to leave the clock where it is?

Mr. Gottschalk: Before we go into that question, I'd like to raise a question with regard to France, that is to say, continental European France. To what extent do you believe that the people of France stand behind either of these gentlemen, Darlan or De Gaulle, or behind the Vichy government?

Mr. Scott: It's pretty hard to have an opinion, because we can't take a Gallup poll in France. We get reports out of France

that something like 90 per cent of the people are actually supporting, in principle, the De Gaullist cause, but, frankly, I can see no evidence for that. Just recently, for instance, when the German armies decided to march into unoccupied France, they marched in. The opposition was very minor from all the reports we can possibly get. That doesn't mean to me that 90 per cent of the people of France are really out-and-out active supporters of De Gaulle. Maybe they sympathize with him, but, if they merely sympathize passively, that doesn't do us a great deal of good.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: You must remember, of course, that the reports we get from Vichy France are under the control of the Berlin propaganda machine, and, as a consequence, if there had been any resistance, we probably wouldn't have learned about it. Nevertheless, it seems fairly clear that the amount of resistance that was put up was not so great as to leak out.

Bloch, that would seem to fit in very well with your statement recently, and my own statement, to the effect that there is a defeatist tradition inside France. Apparently the defeatists in France at the present moment, in European France at least, hold the upper hand and possibly have the support of a large part of the population.

MR. BLOCH: The defeatists own the guns at present. That is a very important factor. Also, you must remember—maybe you have already forgotten—that news about resistance has leaked out. Also, we must remember that the workers did not go voluntarily to Germany as they were asked to do. They actively resisted.

It is true that we did not have any active resistance by the army, but we did have very powerful resistance on occasion by the workers. But at this particular moment a policy of confusion was again used, which was extremely dangerous, because Pétain voiced that sort of an academic protest which you would voice if I would make a historical inaccuracy.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: It is true probably that there has been a great

FRENCH

DESERT
SEMI-DESERT
CANARY ISLANDS
SPAIN
BALEARIC ISLANDS
TANGIERS
GIBRALTAR
ALGIERS
CASABLANCA
SAFI
FEZ
MOROCCO
COLOMB BECHAR
TOUGGOURT
VILLA CISNEROS
RIO DE ORO
ALGERIA
ADRAR
REGANE
TIDIKELT
S A H
TESSALIT
DAKAR
WALATA
FRENCH
TIMBUKTU
WEST
BATHURST
GAMBIA
BISSAU
BOLAMA
GUINEA
GAO
BAMAKO
CONAKRY
FREETOWN
SIERRA LEONE
MIAMEY
BOBO
KANO
MONROVIA
LIBERIA
GOLD COAST
TOGO
DAHOMEY
NIGERIA
IVORY COAST
BINGERVILLE
ACCRA
TAKORADI
PORTO NOVO
LAGOS
AKASA
BRAZIL-MONROVIA
KEY TO TRANSPORTATION
ROADS
BUS ROUTES
RAILROADS
PROJECTED R.R.
AIR ROUTES

H AFRICA

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE PICTOMAP by HAROLD HAYDON

deal of opposition and that the anti-Vichy feeling in European France is strong.

I agree with Scott, nevertheless, that it is disappointing that there hasn't been a great deal more opposition. For example, when the pro-Axis powers invaded territories belonging to France, as they did in Indo-China, there was practically no opposition. On the other hand, when the Allied Nations invaded Madagascar or Syria or even more recently North Africa, there was a marked opposition. That seems to indicate something, doesn't it?

MR. BLOCH: I again disagree with you. The opposition which was given in Madagascar and the lack of opposition in Indo-China are mainly a matter to be decided by the army. If there had been really popular opposition in Madagascar, we would have had a defense of the towns, as there has been in Stalingrad, where the people really are resisting.

MR. SCOTT: The situation in Madagascar is quite different from that in Stalingrad. After all, not very many of the people in Madagascar are really Frenchmen.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I want to go on to the point that Bloch made a little while ago about stopping the clock. Do you think that we're likely to stop the clock by going into North Africa?

MR. SCOTT: I think if you mean by "stopping the clock" to leave things just as they are for the moment, that that is the thing that we would most like to do—yes. We don't want to go in and arouse internal conflicts. We don't want to try to solve their social and political questions at the present moment if it is going to mean the deterioration of our military effort. We have, after all, one primary thing to consider here.

MR. BLOCH: Wait a minute! You can't do it like that, because the status quo is just being drawn away from underneath your seat. What is actually happening is a dynamic development and not a static situation.

MR. SCOTT: Quite.

Mr. Bloch: You must understand that there are about a hundred thousand refugees working as forced laborers in North Africa. You must remember that the Jews have been barred from professions and otherwise persecuted. You must remember that the trade-unions are suppressed and that leaders of the workers are in jail. If you set them free, of course, new popular trends will be released again. You have to do something about it, don't you?

Mr. Scott: Yes, I'm afraid we do have to do something. I would simply say that our best policy is to do as little as we possibly can so as to arouse as little antagonism as possible.

There's another element of the thing that I'd like to interject there, namely, that we pretend to pursue a democratic policy. Democracy to me means the privilege of peoples, not only in the United States, but the privilege of peoples in other parts of the world, to decide their own local questions for themselves. What right have we, as an invading group, who intend to use North Africa only temporarily, to go in there and direct their future social policy?

Mr. Gottschalk: On this question I'm rather on Bloch's side. It seems to me that any decision that we make at this point is bound to have some effect upon the future of North Africa. If we make the wrong choice, we're likely to have the wrong effect upon North Africa. If we choose a person who is tarred with the defeatist stick and with the Vichy anti-liberties policy, then we are going to have a bad situation in North Africa sometime in the future.

Mr. Bloch: I'm a little disturbed because Scott here presumes that the majority of the people would welcome the fact that the clock has been turned back so very long and that, therefore, it would be much more pleasant if we would leave things as they are now.

I believe that the people have given evidence that they do not like this situation. Therefore, if we want popular support, we must continue to give support to popular movements and popular forces which finally will work out to our own advantage.

MR. SCOTT: Popular movements and forces if those popular movements and forces are the general will of a vast majority of the people, not just a simple majority. For if they are the will merely of a simple majority, we risk having a sort of internal revolutionary movement within North Africa at the same time that we are trying to accomplish one great big objective. If we permit local conflicts in a region like North Africa to slow up our war effort, then we risk losing the whole war. If we lose the whole war, then who in North Africa is ever going to have the right to decide his own problems for himself?

MR. BLOCH: Scott, I presume that you are a good American.

MR. SCOTT: I hope so.

MR. BLOCH: I presume that you are taking the Constitution seriously and that you are taking the Atlantic Charter seriously. All of these laws by the Vichy government were laws exactly in the line of Hitler's laws. All that I am saying here is in the line of our own policy. Therefore, if you are a good American here, a loyal and a law-abiding citizen here, you must be a revolutionary in every Fascist state. It is the particular nature of this war that we want to bring freedom to all the peoples.

MR. SCOTT: No, I can't be a revolutionary and take the American Constitution to Morocco.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: On this point it seems fairly clear that we're not going to agree. There is the short-term policy and the long-term policy involved, and frequently they are so definitely in conflict that nothing can be done to reconcile them.

That raises another question. Let us have the next major question suggested to us.

ANNOUNCER: *When American troops moved into Vichy Africa, Secretary Hull announced that the wisdom of our policy of maintaining friendly relations with Vichy had achieved its goal. But a number of* ROUND TABLE *listeners questioned this. They asked whether our Vichy*

policy did not rather succeed in confusing the French people, in undermining the influence of General De Gaulle and the Fighting French, and in giving Hitler valuable time. What do you think?

MR. SCOTT: We have here a most serious question—really a general question that applies not only to our policy toward Vichy but, if you will, to our policy of several years toward Japan—a policy that's often been called "appeasement," a policy that some people have even branded as "pro-Fascist."

I'm not sure that there is any justification for that kind of epithets' being applied to it. What do you think?

MR. GOTTSCHALK: No, I agree with you. We've got to draw a distinction between "understanding" and "justifying." I think Mr. Hull has made clear that we can no longer misunderstand what the policy of the State Department was.[11]

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[11] On November 8, Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a statement to the nation on the policy that has been followed by the State Department in relation to Vichy France. That statement said in part:

"People who have been concerned about the Vichy policy of this government will now be able to see clearly and fully its entire content.

"The liberation of French Morocco by American military forces carries forward the various purposes and objectives of this government in pursuing its policy toward Vichy. This policy has been directed toward ultimately liberating France from her German captors. The American, British and Canadian governments have wholeheartedly favored and supported this policy. The more important of those purposes have been:

"1. Opportunity for the Government of the United States to get from week to week highly important information virtually from the inside of Germany-controlled territory, and from North Africa regarding Axis subversive activities, and other important phases of the international situation.

"2. Maintenance of close relations with the French people and encouragement of leadership in opposition to Hitler wherever it exists.

"3. Keeping alive the basic concepts of freedom of the French people, looking toward ultimate restoration of free institutions for France as they existed before German occupation.

"4. Retention of closest personal touch on the ground with all phases of the French and German situation under the armistice prevailing between Germany and France; resistance to increased German pressure on France to go

There's no doubt that from the very beginning of our participation in the war the State Department, and every other branch of the government, has been working very actively to assure the success of the attack upon North Africa. The State Department certainly has been trying its hardest to win that phase of the war. But yet, it doesn't seem to me that the achievements justify the policy that the State Department adopted. It seems to me fairly debatable whether we wouldn't have achieved at least as much in North Africa if we had followed another attitude toward Vichy—if we had been unfriendly to Vichy and more friendly to De Gaulle. Would you agree with me on that?

MR. BLOCH: To put it quite clearly, I never agreed with those commentators who said that our own State Department was Fascist or who said that our own State Department did not want to win the war. Our State Department is not Fascist, and it definitely does want to win the war. The matter we are debating here is whether or not the policy has been effective, and how effective it has been.

I personally do not have the question before me whether there is too much optimism or too little optimism. I think the right attitude to take is to have a short-run pessimism and skepticism toward all the Darlans and all the temporary governments but to have very definitely a long-run optimism in developments.

MR. SCOTT: I think we can have that long-run optimism all right, and that would involve, perhaps, some recognition on your part of the thing we were talking about a while ago—the necessity

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beyond the armistice provisions and to collaborate with Germany; constant effort to prevent delivery of the French fleet or any part of it into German military hands or to give military support to the German aims; that also includes French bases all along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coast.

"5. And last, but most important, to pave the way and prepare the background in the most effective manner possible for the planning and sending of the military expedition into the Western Mediterranean area, and to assist the movements supporting present British operations farther East."



* The figures are for 1936 and are taken from *Annuaire statistique de la France, 1938.*

of using the short-run situation to the best advantage possible—would it not?

MR. BLOCH: I think that if we establish in the long run, and I mean only in the next few months, too many governments and if we split up Frenchmen into Darlanists and Giraudists and De Gaullists, we do exactly what Hitler wants.

MR. SCOTT: Isn't the best policy, therefore, merely to use one in one place and another in another place? For instance, possibly use Darlan in North Africa and use De Gaulle in West Africa and Indo-China and wherever we can.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: But, it seems to me that what you're doing there is dissipating energy. On the whole, despite the enthusiasm of the first three days of this week, it seems to me the results have not been so satisfactory as at first we hoped. To be sure, President Roosevelt and others indicated that we must not be overoptimistic. Nevertheless, we were, and now it seems that we have been unduly optimistic.

MR. SCOTT: I'm not sure that that was Roosevelt's fault, or

anybody's fault, except people who saw a great thing happening and who immediately doubled it and made it seem many times as great as it was.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Quite the contrary, I'm sure it was not Roosevelt's fault. He was very anxious and deliberately went out of his way to indicate to us that we must not be overoptimistic. Nevertheless, the results seem far from justifying our enthusiasm. The French fleet has definitely not come over. Pétain hasn't come over; quite the contrary, the latest news dispatches seem to indicate he has committed himself to German collaboration. No resistance, or very little resistance, was met inside France when the Germans occupied hitherto unoccupied France. The occupation of Tunisia, and particularly of Bizerte, which is a most important point strategically, is as yet a questionable point.

MR. BLOCH: However, I would not minimize too much the strictly military results. I think there were very definite military results. One of the results was, for instance, to get hold of raw materials and other supplies which otherwise would have been in the hands of the Germans through the intermediary of Vichy France. I also believe that it was very healthy that for once it was made clear to many people in this country, and even in France, that mugwumpism as a philosophy cannot be carried too far.

MR. SCOTT: I'm glad to hear you give that positive emphasis on that point because actually it seems to me we have accomplished a magnificent achievement there in North Africa. Whether we might have attained the same goal or a slightly greater goal by some other means is a very doubtful thing. We can't put this into a chemical test tube and try it all over again in some other way in order to decide. But we have accomplished something.

Part of that was the result of State Department policy; much of it was the result, of course, of most careful military and naval planning and the accurate coordination of all our military efforts there in North Africa.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I don't want to deny that there has been a great deal accomplished from a military point of view in North Africa during the last week. What has been accomplished is, of course, tremendous.

I'm a little disappointed with regard to our diplomatic policy there. There is a great danger that the political problem is going to be overlooked in our enthusiasm for our military achievements. The long-term solution of the fate of North Africa, France, and, in fact, the Mediterranean world lies in our diplomatic policy no less than in our military success. It is to be hoped that that policy will be based at least in part on the Atlantic Charter and not entirely on military exigencies.

Around the Round Table . . . .

HENRI SIMON BLOCH is now engaged in research at the University of Chicago, under the Social Science Research Committee, on public borrowing and has also been giving lectures on the war economy for the Institute of Military Affairs at the University. Dr. Bloch holds his Doctor's degree in economics from the University of Nancy in France. He has studied at the universities of Paris and of Strasbourg and at the Academy of International Law, The Hague, Netherlands. He has written numerous articles and is the coauthor of *Economic Mobilization* (with Lange, Harbison, Lewis) (1940) and of *How To Win the War and the Peace* (with Ezekiel, Meiklejohn, and others) (in press).

LOUIS GOTTSCHALK, Professor of Modern History at the University of Chicago, is especially interested in the field of French history and is an interpreter of French-American relations. He is the author of *Jean Paul Marat: A Study in Radicalism* (1927), which has also appeared in French translation; *The Era of the French Revolution* (1929); *Lafayette Comes to America* (1935); *Lafayette Joins the American Army* (1937); *Lady-in-Waiting: The Romance of Lafayette and Aglaé de Hunolstein* (1939); and *Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution* (1942). Dr. Gottschalk received his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Cornell University and later was associated with the department of history there. He has taught at the University of Illinois and the University of Louisville and since 1925 has been associated with the University of Chicago. At the present time Dr. Gottschalk is also assistant editor of the *Journal of Modern History*.

FRANKLIN D. SCOTT, Associate Professor of Modern History at Northwestern University, received his undergraduate training at the University of Chicago, where he was granted a Ph.B. degree. Continuing his studies there, he was awarded an M.A. degree before he went to Harvard to receive his Ph.D. Dr. Scott has also studied and done extensive research abroad, especially at the University of Stockholm, Sweden, and in the Scandinavian countries. Dr. Scott has taught also at Simpson College, Radcliffe, and the University of Wisconsin. He is a contributor to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and is the author of *Bernadotte and the Fall of Napoleon* (1935), which in 1937 had the distinction of being translated into Swedish. Dr. Scott is now engaged in preparing a general history of Scandinavia.

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tion of France under a nonparliamentary but nondictatorial regime within a federated Europe.

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———, "The Coming French Revolution," *American Mercury,* November, 1941. *A survey of underground resistance to the Nazis.*

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QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on pages 25–27.

*

1. In your opinion has the successful military attack and occupation of French North Africa proved the State Department correct in maintaining friendly relations with Vichy? What are the arguments for a diplomacy of opportunism? What are its advantages? Is any other course feasible in wartime?

2. Discuss the problem of governing the people of North Africa. Is there a relation between what we do there and the effectiveness of our propaganda to the French? What is the difference between freeing territory and freeing people?

3. Is there a relation between the way the war is fought and the sort of post-war world it is possible to have? Do you think it necessary to fight the war without thought or action about the post-war world? Discuss. Why do many Americans feel that winning the war is a separate problem from winning the peace?

4. Who is the government of France? Why did so many French leaders become collaborationists? Historically, have defeated countries often had collaborationist leadership? What has General Charles de Gaulle stated as Fighting French political aims? Should the United States recognize the Fighting French as a government in exile? Discuss.

5. What do you think should be done about the general problem of colonialism? What are the possible solutions to this problem? If United States troops conquer Axis-dominated territory, should the people be freed from the oppression of Axis laws, or should those social problems be set aside for solution after the war is over? What sort of government should the United States approve in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco?

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ROUND TABLE NETWORK OF 104 STATIONS

2:30 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Manchester, N.H.	WFEA	1370
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Baltimore, Md.	WBAL	1090	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1260	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1410	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Wilmington, Dela.	WDEL	1150
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Zanesville, Ohio	WHIZ	1240

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

Amarillo, Texas	KGNC	1440	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1490	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1380	Pittsburg, Kans.	KOAM	810
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1450	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Fort Worth, Texas	KGKO	570	San Antonio, Texas	WOAI	1200
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1300	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Laurel, Miss.	WAML	1340	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1240
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920			

12:30 P.M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Yuma, Ariz.	KYUM	1240
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240			

11:30 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1410	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			

STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION

Milwaukee, Wis. WTMJ 620 4:00 P.M. C.W.T.

SECOND OF THREE PROGRAMS ON

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN CRISIS

CRISIS ADMINISTRATION

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A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

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SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1942

(*Originally scheduled for November 15*)

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NEIL H. JACOBY, Professor of Finance, School of Business, University of Chicago

I. F. STONE, Washington Correspondent, *Nation* and *P.M.*

DON K. PRICE, Public Administration Clearing House, Chicago

•

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[PRINTED IN U.S.A.]